In Kurmanchal Institute of Degree and Diploma v. MJP Rohilkhan University, (2007) 6 SCC 35, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held while construing the provisions of the UGC Act and the Uttar Pradesh State University Act, 1973 that each University in the country, though recognized by the UGC, must have its own territorial jurisdiction, save and except for Central Universities or those specified in legislative enactments. In that context, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“The submission of the learned counsel that for the purpose of running a distance education course, extra territorial activities must be carried out may not be entirely correct. It is one thing to say that the University takes recourse to the correspondence courses conferring degrees or diplomas but it would be another thing to say that study centres would be permitted to operate which requires close supervision of the University. In a study centre, teachers are appointed, practical classes are held and all other amenities which are required to be provided for running a full-fledged institution or college are provided. Such an establishment although named as a study centre and despite the fact that the course of study and other study materials are supplied by the University cannot be permitted to be established beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the University”. Akhtar Ali Ansari v. State of U.P., (2016) 1 UPLBEC 669 (FB).
In the case of Vijayalakshmi Rice Mill v. Commercial Tax Officers, Palokal, (2006) 6 SCC 763, a distinction was sought to be drawn between ‘Cess’ and ‘Tax’ in the following terms:
“Hence ordinarily a cess is also a tax, but is a special kind of a tax. Generally tax raises revenue which can be used generally for any purpose by the State. For instance, the Income Tax or Excise or Sales Tax which generate revenue can be utilized by the Union or State Governments for any purpose, e.g. for payment of salary to the members of the armed forces or civil servants, police, etc. or for development programs, etc. However, cess is a tax which generates revenue which is utilized for a specific purpose. For instance, health cess raises revenue which is utilized for health purposes, e.g., building hospitals, giving medicines to the poor etc. Similarly education cess raises revenue which is used for building schools or other educational purposes. Gujarat Ambuja Exports Ltd. v. State of Uttarakhand, (2016) 1 UPLBEC 627.
Where the price at which goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee is different for different places of removal, then each such price shall be deemed to be the normal value thereof. Clause (b)(iii) is very important and makes it clear that a depot, the premises of a consignment agent, or any other place or premises from where the excisable goods are to be sold after their clearance from the factory are all places of removal. What is important to note is that each of these premises is referable only to the manufacturer and not to the buyer of excisable goods. The depot, or the premises of a consignment agent of the manufacturer are obviously places which are referable only to the manufacturer. Even the expression “any other place or premises” refers only to a manufacturer’s place or premises because such place or premises is stated to be where excisable goods “are to be sold”. The place or premises from where excisable goods are to be sold can only be the manufacturer’s premises or premises referable to the manufacturer. CCE v. Ispat Industries Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 631.
The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in Landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. Boorugu Mahadev and Sons v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao, (2016) 3 SCC 343.