Tag Archives: claimant

Arbitration – Notice Under Section 21 of the Act is Mandatory

Considering that the running theme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is the consent or agreement between the parties at every stage, Section 21 performs an important function of forging such consensus on several aspects viz., the scope of the disputes, the determination of which disputes remain unresolved; of which disputes are time-barred; of identification of the claims and counter claims and most importantly, on the choice of arbitrator. Thus, the inescapable conclusion on a proper interpretation of Section 21 of the Act is that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the notice under Section 21 of the Act by the claimant invoking the arbitration clause, preceding the reference of disputes to arbitration, is mandatory. In other words, without such notice, the arbitration proceedings that are commenced would be unsustainable in law. Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Ozone Overseas Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC Online Del 7228.   

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Termination of – Arbitration Proceedings

Section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 contains a heading “Termination of Proceedings”. Sub-section (1) provides that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the Arbitral Tribunal under sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) enumerates the circumstances when the Arbitral Tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of arbitral proceedings. Clause (c) of Section 32(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e. (i) the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary, or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as contemplated under Section 32 shall arise only when the claim is not terminated under Section 25(a) and proceeds further. The words “unnecessary” or “impossible” as used in clause (c) of Section 32(2), cannot be said to be covering a situation where proceedings are terminated in default of the claimant. The words “unnecessary” or “impossible” has been used in different contexts than to one of default as contemplated under Section 25(a). Sub-section (3) of Section 32 further provides that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral proceedings subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section 34. Section 33 is the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature or to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. Section 34(4) reserves the power of the court to adjourn the proceedings in order to give the Arbitral Tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. On the termination of proceedings under Sections 32(2) and 33(1), Section 33(3) further contemplates termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal, whereas the aforesaid words are missing in Section 25. When the legislature has used the phrase “the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall terminate” in Section 32(3), non-use of such phrase in Section 25 (a) has to be treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and object can only be that if the claimant shows sufficient cause, the proceedings can be recommenced. Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd. v. Tuff Drilling Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 470.

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Filed under Arbitration, Termination of Proceedings, Termination of Proceedings, Uncategorized

Compassionate Appointment – Not Pecuniary Advantage under the Motor Vehicles Act

In Vimal Kanwar v. Kishore Dan, (2013) 7 SCC 476, while deciding the issue “whether the salary receivable by the claimant on compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “Pecuniary Advantage” liable for deduction, it was held as under:

       “Compassionate Appointment” can be one of  the conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to that effect is framed by the employer. In case, the employee dies in harness i.e., while in serviceleaving behind the dependants, one of the dependants may request forcompassionate appointment to maintain the family of the deceased employee whodies in harness. This cannot be stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one’s death and have no correlation with the amount receivable undera statute occasioned on account of accidental death. Compassionate appointmentmay have nexus with the death of an employee while in service but it is notnecessary that it should have a correlation with the accidental death. Anemployee dies in harness even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain thefamily of the deceased one of the dependants may be entitled for compassionateappointment but that cannot be termed as “pecuniary advantage” that comes underthe propriety of the Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received on suchappointment is not liable for deduction for determination of compensation underthe Motor Vehicles Act. Smt. Suman v.Himanshu, 2018 (130) ALR 503.

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Filed under Motor Vehicles Act, Pecuniary Advantage

Counterclaims

In State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises, (2012) 12 SCC 581, addressing the issue pertaining to counterclaims, the Court observed as follows:
“As far as counterclaims are concerned, there is no room for ambiguity in regard to the relevant date for determining the limitation. Section 3(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that in regard to a counterclaim in suits, the date on which the counterclaim is made in court shall be deemed to be the date of institution of the counterclaim. As the Limitation Act, 1963 is made applicable to arbitrations, in the case of a counterclaim by a respondent in an arbitral proceeding, the date on which the counterclaim is made before the arbitrator will be the date of institution insofar as counterclaim is concerned. There is, therefore, no need to provide a date of commencement as in the case of claims of a claimant. Section 21 of the Act is therefore not relevant for counterclaims. There is however one exception. Where the respondent against whom a claim is made, had also made a claim against the claimant and sought arbitration by serving a notice to the claimant but subsequently raises that claim as a counterclaim in the arbitration proceedings initiated by the claimant, instead of filing a separate application under Section 11 of the Act, the limitation for such counterclaim should be computed, as on the date of service of notice of such claim on the claimant and not on the date of filing of the counterclaim. Voltas Limited v. Rolta India Limited, (2014) 4 SCC 516.

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