Adverse Possession is hostile possession by assertion of a hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner as held in M. Venkatesh v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1.In Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316 it was held as under: “Animus Possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and, hence, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession.” Brijesh Kumar v. Sharda Rai, (2019) 9 SCC 369.
In Vikas Sankhala v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal, (2017) 1 SCC 350, it was held as under: “Migration from reserved category to general category shall be admissible to those reserved category candidates who secured more marks obtained by the last unreserved category candidates who are selected, subject to the condition that such reserved category candidates did not avail any other special concession. It is clarified that concession of passing marks in TET would not be treated as concession falling in the aforesaid category.” Pradeep Sing Dehal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2019) 9 SCC 276.
An arbitration agreement does not require registration under the Registration Act. Even if it is found as one of the clauses in a contract or instrument, it is an independent agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration, which is independent of the main contract or instrument. Therefore having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act read with Section 16(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registerable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions and Engineering Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 209.
Where the contract or instrument is voidable at the option of a party (as for example under Section 19 of the Contract Act, 1872), the invalidity that attaches itself to the main agreement may also attach itself to the arbitration agreement, if the reasons which make the main agreement voidable, exist in relation to the making of the arbitration agreement also. For example, if a person is made to sign an agreement to sell his property under threat of physical harm or threat to life, and the said person repudiates the agreement on that ground not only the agreement for sale, but any arbitration agreement therein will not be binding. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions and Engineering Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 209.
In Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) the word “substantial” is defined as
‘Substantial.—Of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; veritable. — Something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal. … Synonymous with material.’
The word “substantially“ has been defined to mean “essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially”. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word “substantial” means “of ample or considerable amount of size; sizeable, fairly large; having solid worth or value, of real significance; solid; weighty; important, worthwhile; of an act, measure, etc. having force or effect, effective, thorough”. The word “substantially” has been defined to mean “in substance; as a substantial thing or being; essentially, intrinsically”. Therefore the word “substantial” is not synonymous with “dominant” or “majority”. It is closer to “material” or “important” or “of considerable value”. “Substantially” is closer to “essentially”. Both words can signify varying degrees depending on the context.D.A.V. College Trust & Management Society v. Director of Public Instructions, (2019) 9 SCC 185
In P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 348 the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the expression “means and includes”, wherein it was observed as follows:
“A particular expression is often defined by the legislature by using the word “means” or the word “includes”. Sometimes the words “means and includes” are used. The use of the word “means” indicates that ‘definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition’. (See Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665 (CA); Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682). The word “includes” when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words “means and includes”, on the other hand, indicate ‘an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions’. (See: Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps, 1899 AC 99 (PC); Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164). ”
It is thus clear that the word “means” indicates that the definition is exhaustive and complete. It is a hard-and-fast definition and no other meaning can be given to it. On the other hand, the word “includes” enlarges the scope of the expression. The word “includes” is used to signify that beyond the meaning given in the definition clause, other matters may be included keeping in view the nature of the language and object of the provision. D.A.V. College Trust & Management Society v. Director of Public Instructions, (2019) 9 SCC 185