revision petition has a narrower scope than an “appeal”. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC, the dictinction
between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” was discussed as
“revision” are expressions of common usage in Indian statute and the
distinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” is
well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves
a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved
person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance
has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure,
and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional
jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be
exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of
revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction.
The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of
keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising Tribunal within the bounds of
their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure
established by law and according to well defined principles of justice.”
In Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 it
was held that:
jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa.
Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of
statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or
revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the
case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the
trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and
law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides
for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction,
though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated
with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not
continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional
court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the
permissible parameters provided in the statute.”
Ordinarily, the power of revision can be exercised only when illegality,
irrationality, or impropriety is found in the decision making process of the for
a below. Karnataka Housing Board v.
K.A. Nagamani. (2019) 6 SCC
In Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 733 it was held as under:
“The term interlocutory order is a term of well known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like Statutes. In Webster’s New World Dictionary “interlocutory” has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the right and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. The term interlocutory order in Section 397 (2) of the CRPC has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order. Yogish Arora v. Smt. Jennette Yogish Arora, 2018 (129) ALR 339.
Section 156(3) applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the Learned Magistrate can verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. Such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. It becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.
There has to be prior applications under section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart the veracity of the same can also be verified by the Learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations in the case. As a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal cases, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 are being filed. That apart, the Learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR. Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287.